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INHERENT JUDICIAL RULE MAKING AUTHORITY AND THE RIGHT TO
APPEAL: TIME FOR CLARIFICATION
Justin L. Matheny
I. INTRODUCTION
If one had a question of when to timely file a document with the court system,
where would he or she look for authority regarding timing issues? Many current
law students, recent law school graduates, and practicing attorneys could not
imagine looking somewhere other than some version of the Rules of Civil
Procedure or other court rules. Yet, some would be surprised to discover that the
logically and orderly numbered (though not so often easily understood)
Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and other court rules were not always the
place to look for guidance. It was not long ago, at least within this writer's life-
time, that all court rules were a set of statutory procedures devised entirely by the
state legislature. These rules were products of the legislative process, just like
budget bills, criminal statutes, and tax measures, and were considered within the
exclusive discretion of the popularly elected, legislative branch.
In 1975, however, the Supreme Court of Mississippi began the process that
plucked this responsibility away from the legislature by almost "inventing,"
according to some, what is termed the judiciary's inherent authority to promul-
gate rules of practice, procedure, and evidence in Mississippi state courts. As a
result, cases and other controversies examining what is included or excluded
from this inherent authority have arisen from time to time. Since 1975, the focal
point of these problems has been the general premise that the judicial branch
now holds (and at times must protect) the power to regulate the procedures used
in the courts of Mississippi.
Using this focal point, recent Mississippi decisions may signal an expansion in
inherent power of the judiciary from a previous position with the potential of
harmful consequences, depending on which side of the line your opinion or
interests may fall. Therefore, it is the purpose of this Comment first to review
examples of the progression in Mississippi case law regarding the line the courts
have drawn between legislative and judicial rule-making authority. Next, this
Comment will discuss how the recent decisions have applied this inherent authority
precedent to the issue of the right to appeal. Finally, an analysis of precedent and
these recent right to appeal cases will consider the implications of the potential
shift in the scope of inherent rulemaking authority of Mississippi's judiciary.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Newell, Hall, and the Adoption of Court Rules
The modem development of the Mississippi judiciary's inherent authority to
make rules of practice, procedure, and evidence began with the case of Newell v.
State1 decided in 1975. The appellant in Newell was convicted of assault and bat-
tery with intent to kill.2 He sought review by the Supreme Court, primarily
1. 308 So. 2d 71 (Miss. 1975).
2. Id. at 72.
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asserting that the trial court should be reversed because the jury had been erro-
neously instructed.' The specific problem was that a criminal statute,4 as enacted
by the legislature, prohibited trial judges from instructing a jury on applicable
principles of law without a request from either of the parties.' At the trial, the
jury had been left essentially uninstructed as to the law because of the statute.6
The court acted on this result by striking down the statute and carving out what
has become known as the basis for its current inherent rulemaking authority.
7
First, the court noted that legislative suggestions concerning procedural rules
deserve respect and will be followed unless they provide "an impediment to jus-
tice or an impingement upon the constitution."8 Second, the court stated that the
inherent power vested in the court "emanates from.., the separation of powers
and the vesting of judicial powers in the courts."9 In connection with this state-
ment, the court looked to § 144 of the Mississippi Constitution and concluded
that the judicial power prescribed there includes the power to make rules of prac-
tice and procedure "for the efficient disposition of judicial business" that are not
contrary to the constitution." Next, the opinion proclaimed that the historical
basis for the specific legislative enactment curtailing instruction of the jury was
grounded on a belief in the restraint of a tyrannical monarchy and therefore out-
dated."
Newell went further by asserting that procedural decisions regarding the court
system are to be left to the judicial branch that is more well-equipped and
learned in the law than the legislature. 2 Separation of powers principles from
Article 1, §§ 1 and 2, together with § 144 "leave[] no room for a division of
authority between the judiciary and the legislature as to the power to promulgate
rules necessary to accomplish the judiciary's constitutional purpose."" For these
reasons, the court declared § 99-17-35 of the Mississippi Code (1972) invalid as
contrary to the Mississippi Constitution."
In the days following Newell, the decision was used by the court, in piecemeal
opinions, to regulate areas of practice and procedure that fell within this new-
found authority of the judicial branch.' In 1981, however, the Supreme Court
attempted to create, in a complete procedural overhaul, the first "Mississippi
Rules of Civil Procedure" modeled after its counterpart, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 6 The mechanics of this controversy are well remembered by
some and well documented for others; therefore, the details are outside the scope
of this writing. 7
3. Id.
4. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-17-35 (1972).
5. Newell, 308 So. 2d at 73.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 77-78; see also William H. Page, Constitutionalism and Judicial Rulemaking: Lessons from the
Crisis in Mississippi, 2 Miss. C. L. REv. 4, 5 (1982).
8. Newell, 308 So. 2d at 76.
9. Id.
10. Id. (quoting S. Pac. Lbr. Co. v. Reynolds, 206 So. 2d 334, 335 (Miss. 1968) (discussing Miss. CO NST.
art. 1, § 144)).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 77 (citing Miss. CONsT. art. I, §§ 1, 2 & 144).
14. Id. at 78.
15. Hall v. State, 539 So. 2d 1338, 1345 (Miss. 1989).
16. See Page, supra note 7.
17. See id.; see also Lenore L. Prather, A Century of Judicial History, 69 Miss. L. J. 1013, 1043-46
(2000).
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Basically, the result of the 1981 "Rules of Civil Procedure Conflict" was that
Newell provided the vehicle for the court to adopt the rules that in turn invalidat-
ed the statutory procedure proscribed by the legislature regarding civil procedure
in Mississippi trial courts." The court, in large measure, "won out" due to a
compromised position of the legislature."9 Other rules followed, including the
Mississippi Rules of Evidence, the Mississippi Supreme Court Rules, the
Uniform Circuit Court Rules, the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court
Practice, the Uniform Chancery Court Rules, and the Uniform County Court
Rules.2"
Around eight years after the adoption of these rules, the Mississippi Supreme
Court issued what would become a companion case to Newell that further exert-
ed the judiciary's inherent rule making authority. In Hall v. State,2 the Child
Sexual Abuse Act22 was held to be unconstitutional because the statute com-
manded that certain hearsay statements of minor victims were admissible against
alleged sex offenders at trial.2 The court deemed the act was in direct conflict
with the inherent authority of the judicial branch to prescribe trial procedure."
The court used Newell, which in the past had been confined to striking older pro-
cedural statutes and codifying trial procedure, to void a newer, seemingly sub-
stantive statute aimed at prevention of the sexual abuse of children.
Hall's reasoning began with the statement that § 144 of the Mississippi
Constitution provides powers to the judiciary which include the ability to formu-
late rules of practice and procedure for the disposition of judicial business.25
Support came from Newell's analysis that separation of powers places procedural
rulemaking within the judicial branch. Further, the court stated that while the
earlier interpretations of Newell placed emphasis on a practice or procedure
determination, the judicial authority clearly included power to make rules of evi-
dence as well as practice and procedure.2 ' By order (and through the inherent
authority) of the court, the Mississippi Rules of Evidence had been created and
thus were within the exclusive power of the judiciary."
An important footnote included in the court's opinion essentially reinforced
the judiciary's option on questions of Newell import.2" The court indicated that in
every case it would not be bound to overturn a statute that conflicts with its
power.' Instead, out of comity and respect for the legislature, that body could
receive deference from the court, even if a specific statute improperly
encroached upon judicial authority."
18. See Prather, supra note 17.
19. Id.
20. Id.; see also Hall, 539 So. 2d at 1345.
21. Hall, 539 So. 2d at 1340.
22. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-401 etseq. (Supp. 1988).
23. Hall, 539 So. 2d at 1340.
24. Id. at 1346.
25. Id. at 1345 (citing Miss. CoNsT. art. I § 144).
26. Id. at 1345 (citing Newell, 308 So. 2d at 76).
27. Id. at 1345-46 & n.16.
28. Id. at 1346 & n.18 (citing Order In the Matter of the Adoption of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence,
entered November 24, 1985, as reproduced in Miss. R. CT. 240-41 (1988)).
29. Hall, 539 So. 2d at 1346 & n.20; see also Glenn v. Herring, 415 So. 2d 695, 696 (Miss. 1982) (not-
ing that the Court will follow legislative suggestions regarding procedural rules that are not an impediment to
justice).
30. Hall, 539 So. 2d at 1346.
31. Id. at 1346-47.
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B. Court Approaches to Newell-Hall Problem Solving
The approaches of Mississippi courts in solving Newell-Hall problems can be
identified as applying at least one of four lines of reasoning to decide whether to
invalidate an act of government in conflict with the judiciary's inherent authority.
The different approaches include a determination of: (1) whether the governmen-
tal action is substantive or procedural in nature;32 (2) whether the governmental
act bears on the efficiency or effectiveness of the court system;33 (3) whether
some strong public policy in the governmental act merits preclusion of judicial
rulemaking authority; or (4) whether the governmental act is inherently invalid
because it intrudes on the power of the court or is "arguably procedural" and thus
valid only by choice of the court." The following explanation provides examples
of how courts have accounted for these factors when undertaking a Newell-Hall
analysis.
1. Substantive/Procedure Approach
The first approach, distinguishing between substance and procedure, was pri-
marily emphasized during the time between the Newell and Hall decisions.3 For
example, in Haralson v. State, the State moved to strike the trial court "reporter's
notes" on the case because Haralson's attorney had failed to give notice to that
court reporter as was required by then § 9-13-33 of the Mississippi Code
(1972)." 6 The court responded by stating, "While the statute is purely procedural
and in reality an invasion by the legislature of the rule-making power of this
Court, we have followed it for many years; thus adopting it as a rule of this
Court."3 7 However, the court overruled its prior decisions holding that compli-
ance with the statute was jurisdictional38 and officially replaced the requirements
of the statute with Rule 16 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. 9
This approach was not solely confined to appeals taken between the Newell
and Hall decisions. For example, evidence of the substance/procedure distinc-
tion is found in Marshall v. State.4" There, a criminal defendant asked the court
to invalidate the affirmation of his conviction by the Mississippi Court of
Appeals, asserting that the legislature had encroached judicial inherent authority
32. See id. and Newell, 308 So. 2d at 76.
33. SeeNewell, 308 So. 2dat76.
34. See Hall, 539 So. 2d at 1346 & n.20; see also Kala R. Holt, Note, The Balance of Power: Weidrick v.
Arnold and the Conflict over Legislative and Judicial Rulemaking Authority in Arkansas, 46 ARK. L. REv. 627,
645-646 (1993) (citing and quoting Hall, 539 So. 2d at 1335; Ronald C. Morton, Comment, Rules, Rule-mak-
ing, and the Ruled: The Mississippi Supreme Court as Self-Proclaimed Ruler 12 MIss. C. L. REv. 293, 310-15
(1991); and Lawrence J. Franck, Comment, Practice and Procedure in Mississippi: An Ancient Recipe for
Modern Reform, 43 Miss. L. J. 287, 303-04 (1972)). The "arguably procedural test" is used in a situation where
an act is inherently invalid because it encroaches the power of the judiciary, acceptable only at option of the
court. Id. at 646.
35. Hall, 539 So. 2d at 1345 (citing Haralson v. State, 308 So. 2d 222 (Miss. 1975); Scott v. State, 310
So. 2d 703 (Miss. 1975); and Jackson v. State, 337 So. 2d 1242, 1253-57 (Miss. 1976)). As an additional note,
one should distinguish the substantive/procedure analysis in the Newell-Hall context from a seemingly similar
conflict of laws problem arising in federal courts sitting in diversity. The two are not the same.
36. 308 So. 2d at 223.
37. Id. at 223-24.
38. Id. at 224 (This would have required dismissal of the appeal because of the statute's substantive
nature.)
39. Id.
40. 662 So. 2d 566 (Miss. 1995).
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in establishing the tribunal.41 Through its Newell-Hall analysis, the court held
that the power to establish the Mississippi Court of Appeals was substantive law
and clearly within the authority of the legislative branch.42 Additionally, the
majority in Marshall determined that the right of appeal was more than substan-
tive: it was an absolute right provided by law makers.' This right was not judge
made or constitutional, and therefore, subject only to change as provided by the
state legislature."
Perhaps the best example of substantive/procedural analysis is found in the
1993 case of Stevens v. Lake." In that decision, attorneys who had been sanc-
tioned under the Mississippi Litigation Accountability Act" argued that the
statute was void because it was in direct conflict with the judicially created
Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 11." The court dismissed this contention
and held that the act, as indicated by its plain language, did not conflict with the
rule and was therefore valid." Thus, although the statute touched internal proce-
dure of the court by authorizing litigation sanctions, it provided a separate, sub-
stantive cause of action and was permissible legislative action."
2. Efficiency/Effectiveness of the Court's Approach
A second approach used in Newell-Hall analysis focuses on a governmental
action's relationship to the efficiency or administration of justice in the court sys-
tem. For example, in Towner v. Moore ex rel. Quitman County School District,"0
the appellants challenged the use of summary judgment procedure in a circuit
court action for violation of a public servant conflict of interests statute.51 One of
the arguments for reversal was that the legislature, by enacting § 25-4-107(2) of
the Mississippi Code (Supp. 1988), had guaranteed the appellants a right to trial
by jury, thus precluding the granting of summary judgment. 2
The appellants analogized the action to a civil penalty/forfeiture case or quasi-
criminal action.13 Finding that this analogy was not well founded, the court went
on to state that even if that were the case "[i]t is not at all clear our legislature
would have the authority to preclude summary judgment in civil penalty or for-
feiture cases, or order a right to the nullification variant of the right to trial by
jury." Because the legislature had determined that the circuit court would have
41. Id. at 567.
42. Id. at 572.
43. Id. at 568-72.
44. Id. Chief Justice Hawkins, in concurring with the Court, placed emphasis on his disagreement with
the majorityis use of Hall as a basis for its decision and gave a lengthy dissertation on the power of the legisla-
ture to provide laws governing the substance or subject matter jurisdiction of the courts. Id. at 573-80
(Hawkins, C.J., concurring).
45. 615 So. 2d 1177 (Miss. 1993).
46. MIss CODE AN. §§ 11-55-1, etseq. (Supp. 1992).
47. Stevens, 615 So. 2dat 1183.
48. Id. at 1184.
49. Id. The court also addressed issues of comity and acquiescence with the legislature which is noted in
Part II(B)(4) of this comment, infra.
50. 604 So. 2d 1093 (Miss. 1992).
51. Id. at 1095. This was a civil action commenced by the Attorney General for recovery of improperly
obtained schoolteacher salaries. Id.
52. Id. at 1097.
53. Id. at 1098-99.
54. Id. at 1099; see also Newell, 308 So. 2d at 78.
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civil jurisdiction over such cases, the rights of the appellants were exactly those
of any other civil litigant, which included being subject to summary judgment.
55
Therefore, the summary judgment procedure that directly related to the ability of
the court to administer justice was perceived as off limits to legislative control
beyond its initial substantive characterization of the cause of action.
6
Bar disciplinary proceedings are another example of an area that bears on the
effectiveness or efficiency of the court system as well as where the judiciary's
rules govern the practice of law. In Hall v. Mississippi Bar,7 the court expressly
recognized that such regulation of the law profession is "an integral part of the
functioning of the judicial branch and thus not properly subject to the [legisla-
ture]." 8 Attorney discipline is an area where the court exercises its inherent
authority to administer justice in an effective manner by providing, through rule-
making, the process by which disciplinary matters are handled. This is also con-
sistent with the notion that the practice of law is a self-regulating profession.5
9
Additionally, the Mississippi Supreme Court has alluded that its adoption of
internal recusal rules is within the inherent authority of the judiciary in order to
promote the administration of justice. In Tighe v. Crosthwait,60 on motion of a
party for Justice McRae's recusal from an appeal based on a conflict of interest,
Justice Prather, in her statement on the motion, wrote, "This court has inherent
power, which was granted by the Mississippi Constitution 'for the fair adminis-
tration of justice."'61 Further, this includes "the power to establish internal proce-
dures for the administration of recusal motions, including the forced recusal of a
fellow justice, where required."62 Thus, there is strong support in the area of
internal practice for the court's invocation of its inherent authority with support
under the efficiency/effectiveness of the administration of justice approach.
3. Strong Public Policy Approach
A third approach to Newell-Hall problems is really only a slight deviation
from substantive/procedural analysis, but it differs in the respect that the court
will not address the problem with only a strict focus on the statute's particular
substantive or procedural classification. The strong public policy approach is
found in Justice McRae's reasoning in Claypool v. Mladineo.1 In Claypool, a
discovery dispute arose in a medical malpractice case where the lower court
ruled that certain documents were protected under authority of §§ 41-63-9 and
41-63-23 of the Mississippi Code (1972)." 4 The Supreme Court held that the
statutes were enactments of the legislature pursuant to the policy of protection of
55. Towner, 604 So. 2d 1093, 1099 (Miss. 1992).
56. As was the case in Marshall, Justice Hawkins dissented based on the position that Hall and not
Newell was the uncited authority for the majority's opinion and warned that this case represented an enlarge-
ment of judicial inherent authority under Hall. Id. at 1102-03 (Hawkins, P.J., dissenting).
57. 631 So. 2d 120 (Miss. 1993).
58. Id. at 123.
59. See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Preamble: A Lawyer's Professional
Responsibilities, at 9-10.
60. 665 So. 2d 1341 (Miss. 1995).
61. Id. at 1346 (statement of Prather, J.) (quoting Newell, 308 So. 2d at 77).
62. Id. at 1347 (statement of Prather, J.). Also of note, Chief Justice Hawkins joined this statement
regarding the core inherent powers of the judiciary. Id.
63. 724 So. 2d 373 (Miss. 1998). See also Stevens v. Lake, 615 So. 2d 1177 (Miss. 1993) and Part
II(B)(I), supra (discussing substantive nature of the Mississippi Litigation Accountability Act).
64. Claypool, 724 So. 2d at 375.
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the public health, safety, and welfare by affording hospitals a right to keep cer-
tain peer review documents from being discovered in litigation." Because of
public policy, in turn, the statutes were substantive and expressly within the
power of the legislative branch.6 Therefore, presumably, the door has been left
open for a party to argue that law deemed procedural under the first approach
could still express a public policy and, because of the police powers of the legis-
lature, essentially manufacture substance that would be beyond the reach of judi-
cial inherent authority.
4. Direct Inherent Authority or "Arguably Procedural" Approach
Perhaps even more difficult to define than the amorphous "public policy"
approach of Justice McRae, the "arguably procedural" approach has been imple-
mented in cases where the judiciary has used its inherent authority that truly
existed before Newell or Hall. This area of analysis generally raises issues that
are beyond the scope of this comment.67 However, in State v. Blenden,6" an
example since Newell and Hall, the court used its inherent authority to levy dis-
covery violations against the state without specific precedent for such action. 9
In another decision, the court stated that its inherent authority precluded the use
of a jury instruction specifically approved by other jurisdictions and provided
grounds for reversible error.7"
One facet of this approach is more important here because it provides that in
some areas, the court will refuse to invalidate a governmental act that is within
its inherent authority out of comity to the legislature or to further the interests of
justice.71 For example, in Glenn v. Herring,2 the court stated that it would follow
suggestions of the legislature when there is no conflict with a court rule or when
the enactment is not "an impediment to justice."73 This leaves room for discre-
tion in the Newell-Hall analysis; therefore, the court may abstain from the use of
inherent authority even where the statute or rule in question can be deemed pro-
cedural in nature.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: Davis v. Nationwide Recovery
AND THE RIGHT TO APPEAL
The most recent Mississippi Supreme Court opinion utilizing the Newell-Hall
analysis, essentially providing the basis for the questions raised in this Comment,
65. Id. at 377-78.
66. Id. at 380-81. The appellees' apparent triumph due to the court's upholding of the validity of the
statute turned out to be immaterial to their cause. Later in the opinion, the court held that the trial court had
misconstrued the scope of application of the statute. Id.
67. See, e.g., 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1001
(3d. ed. 2002).
68. 748 So. 2d 77 (Miss. 2000).
69. Id. at 89.
70. Bolton v. State, 643 So. 2d 942, 945 (Miss. 1994); see also Mississippi Ethics Comm'n v. Comm. on
Prof'l Resp. of the Mississippi Bar, 672 So. 2d 1222, 1224 (Miss. 1996) (citing and quoting Hall, 539 So. 2d at
1339-40, and stating that ultimate authority as to the ability to issue a subpoena for information held by the
Ethics Commission rested with the Supreme Court and only the Supreme Court).
71. See Hall, 539 So. 2dat 1345 &n.20, and Newell, 308 So. 2d at 77.
72. 415 So. 2d 695 (Miss. 1982).
73. Id. at 696; see also Towner, 604 So. 2d at 1101-03 (Hawkins, P.J., dissenting) (discussing McClendon
v. State, 539 So. 2d 1375, 1377 (Miss. 1989); McCarty v. State, 554 So. 2d 909, 913 (Miss. 1989); and Blanks
v. State, 542 So. 2d 222, 225 (Miss. 1989) as examples of the Supreme Court's allowance of the legislature to
enact a valid law that it chooses to "accept").
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is Davis v. Nationwide Recovery Service, Inc.74 Suit was initially brought against
Davis for collection of a credit card debt in the Harrison County Court.
7 That
court entered judgment against Davis, and after denial of his Rule 60 motion, he
appealed to the Harrison County Circuit Court.76 Twenty-four days elapsed
between the denial of the motion and his "motion for appeal" to the Circuit
Court.77 Section 11-51-79 of the Mississippi Code (1972) provided that such an
appeal between the courts was required to be made within ten days of the entry
of final judgment.7 Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Procedure
(hereinafter "U.R.C.C.C.") 5.04 and 12.03, however, provided thirty days for this
type of appeal.79
The court, citing both Newell and Hall, unanimously concluded that the power
to establish rules regarding appeals from court to court requires that statutes in
conflict with court established rules are void." As a result, Davis's appeal had
been filed timely, and the dismissal was an abuse of the lower court's discretion."
The court also noted that the legislature, prior to this decision yet subsequent to
Davis's appeal, had amended the statute to bring it in conformity with the court-
adopted rule. 2
Not more than six months after Davis was handed down, the Mississippi
Court of Appeals had two occasions to consider the effect of the opinion. First,
in Mitchell v. Parker,3 the appellant challenged the practice of the circuit clerk's
charge of a $100 filing fee for criminal appeals from municipal court to county
court. 4 The trial court ruled that under § 25-7-13 of the Mississippi Code (1972)
such a fee was improper.85 The fee had already been refunded, but Mitchell's
cause of action on this appeal claimed a temporary violation of his constitutional
rights requiring the Court of Appeals to consider the ability of the clerk to assess
this payment.86
The court looked to the provisions of U.R.C.C.C 12.02(B) that set the parame-
ters for a bond to be posted for costs on appeal.8 Judge Southwick, writing for
the court, determined that a natural reading of the court rule provided for two
different bonds (one for costs and one for an appearance) in Mitchell's criminal
appeal.88 Further, the opinion addressed the relevance of Mississippi statutes89
that the rule drew upon in providing for bonds, finding that U.R.C.C.C. 12.02(B)
did not contradict the statutes, but, rather, was broader in some respects.9"
74. 797 So. 2d 929 (Miss. 2001).








83. 804 So. 2d 1066 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
84. Id. at 1068.
85. Id.
86. Id. Specifically, Mitchell was asserting his rights under the Takings Clause.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1070.
89. Id. at 1069 (citing Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 99-35-1, and 99-35-3 (Rev. 2000)).
90. Id. at 1069-70.
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This marked the point where Davis was important in the opinion. Judge
Southwick first stated that a right to appeal must be provided by statute,91 but
once that right exists, the Supreme Court may provide the rules of procedure. 2
Next, and most crucial, the opinion noted that the distinction between the right to
appeal and the right to regulate an appeal may cause an area of uncertainty for
the court." Quoting Moore v. Sanders, Judge Southwick stated that "until
recently statutes that set a 'time with which appeals shall be taken are both
mandatory and jurisdictional, and must be strictly complied with. The court is
without power to ingraft any exception on the statute."'94 Further, he alluded that
this could conflict with Davis's holding that a court rule setting the time for an
appeal controls when in conflict with a statute to the contrary, but that a substan-
tive/procedural determination is not necessary.9
The opinion resolved the problem squarely presented in Mitchell by noting the
"'cooperative spirit' in an effort to provide for the 'fair and efficient administra-
tion of justice"' required by Newell and finding that there was no conflict
between the plain language of the statutes and U.R.C.C.C. 12.02.96 For that rea-
son, it was not necessary to overrule the statutes that were enacted subsequent to
the court rule. Thus, Mitchell avoided the use of the Newell-Hall doctrine to
strike the statutes because they were consistent with the court rule.
The Court of Appeals, however, was not able to avoid the direct implications
of Newell-Hall and the Davis opinion less than a month later when it decided
Wolfe v. City ofD 'Iberville.9 s In that case, a property owner sued D'Iberville for
its refusal to connect water and sewer lines to certain buildings as a result of the
owner's failure to pay past due service charges.9 Wolfe brought suit in county
court for damages and after an adverse summary judgment and some twenty-
seven days later, appealed the decision to circuit court"' That court adopted the
conclusions of fact and law of the lower court and affirmed the summary judg-
ment."' The circuit court went further by finding that Wolfe's appeal was time
barred for failure to comply with § 11-51-79 of the Mississippi Code (1972),
which provided ten days to file a notice of appeal and bond from county to cir-
cuit court.0 2
The dismissal by the circuit court was squarely at odds with U.R.C.C.C. 5.04
as well as the Davis opinion." 3 Thus, the Court of Appeals did consider the
appeal of summary judgment because it was not, in fact, time barred. 4 More
important than the disposition of Wolfe's specific cause, however, was that Judge
91. Id. at 1070 (citing Bickham v. Dep't of Mental Health, 592 So.2d 96, 97 (Miss. 1991)).
92. Id. (citing Bolton, 643 So. 2d at 945).
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting Moore, 569 So. 2d at 1150).
95. Id.
96. Id. (quoting Newell, 308 So. 2d at 78).
97. Id.
98. 799 So. 2d 142 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
99. Id. at 143.
100. Id. at 144.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 146.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 146-47. The grant of summary judgment was upheld on the merits despite the court's ruling
that the trial court erred by finding that appeal from county to circuit court was time barred. As an additional
note, Wolfe's did not technically have to be decided by the Court of Appeals because Wolfe cited no case law in
any brief that he filed prior to his appeal which was an independent ground for ruling against him. Id.
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Southwick, while concurring in the judgment that Davis controlled, expounded
upon the Newell-Hall problem presented by the Davis opinion."'
5
Judge Southwick began by acknowledging that the Newell holding provided
the authority for the present day Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules
of Evidence." 6 Next, Davis, upon which the majority had relied, was cited for its
pronouncement that under the authority of Newell and Hall and in the interest of
uniformity of court procedure, the time for appeals from court to court was con-
trolled by the U.R.C.C.C., exclusive of contrary statutory procedures.
0 7 This was
all well for purposes of Wolfe's appeal; however, Judge Southwick went on to
question the propriety of holding that the right to appeal should fall within the
inherent authority of the courts. 8
In support of the possibility that Davis had created a conflict in precedent, the
concurrence noted the problem with distinguishing between substantive and pro-
cedural acts in the area of the right to appeal.
0 Specifically, Judge Southwick
pointed to Gill v. Mississippi Department of Wildlife Conservation
1 and Fleming
v. State... that state the right to appeal is purely a matter of statute and within the
powers of the legislature. 2 He also stated that Moore v. Sanders"
3 is perhaps
most directly on point, quoting that "statutes setting a 'time within which appeals
shall be taken are both mandatory and jurisdictional, and must be strictly com-
plied with. The court is without power to ingraft any exception on the
statute.""1.4
Taking this into account, the concurrence next discussed the "cooperative spir-
it" that had existed between the judiciary and the legislature in matters concern-
ing the timing of appeals." The legislature has essentially allowed the court to
set the time for appeals in particular areas.1 Judge Southwick further stated:
I believe that under proper understanding of the constitutional divide
between legislative and judicial powers, as defined just the previous year
in Moore v. Sanders, there was no defect in the legislature's imposing
appeal time limits by statute. Indeed, the legislature continued to assert
authority over appeals from county courts in the statute later struck down
in Davis. Nonetheless, a branch of government could be commended for
not insisting on exercising its full range of power. Indeed the Supreme
Court reciprocates when it attempts to accommodate the legislature by
considering statutory procedural rules in a 'cooperative spirit' in an
105. Id. at 148 (Southwick, P.J., concurring).
106. Id. (citing E Keith Ball, Comment, The Limits of the Mississippi Supreme Court's Rulemaking
Authority, 60 Miss. L.J. 359, 363-64 (1990)).
107. Id. (citing Davis, 797 So. 2d at 939).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 574 So. 2d 586 (Miss. 1990).
111. 553 So. 2d 505 (Miss. 1989).
112. Wolfe, 799 So. 2d at 148 (Southwick, P.J., concurring) (discussing Gill, 574 So. 2d at 590 and
Fleming, 553 So. 2d at 506).
113. 569 So. 2d 1148 (Miss. 1990).
114. Wolfe, 799 So. 2d at 148 (Southwick, P.J. concurring) (quoting Moore, 569 So. 2d at 1150). This
quote was also referenced by Judge Southwick in the majority opinion in Mitchell v. Parker, 804 So. 2d 1066
(Miss. Ct. App. 2001), discussed above.
115. Wolfe, 799 So. 2dat 149.
116. Id. (discussing Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-51-5 (1972) (repealed 1991 Miss. LAWS ch. 573, § 141)).
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effort to provide for the 'fair and efficient administration of justice....'
The legislature has retained the central statute creating the right to
appeal, which is granted to either party after a final judgment in circuit
or chancery court in a civil case. That statute is indispensable since the
right to appeal is solely a matter of statute. For now.1"'
This being said, the opinion next turned to the reasons for this position and
viewing Davis narrowly rather than as a mandate that the judiciary possesses
complete control over the entire appeals process.1 8 According to Judge
Southwick, a broad view would be a revolutionary turn in the separation of pow-
ers analysis of the court. 9 He next reviewed the limited criteria available in mak-
ing a distinction between practice and substance in rule making, finding that
leaving the right of appeal to the legislature is consistent with the republican
form of government as required by the United States Constitution and prior prac-
tice.120 Adding that cases such as Gill and Moore signal that the Mississippi
Supreme Court has not created a right to appeal for all situations, he analogized
the right to appeal with statutes of limitations that control whether a party has
timely commenced a claim.121 These are "indisputably policy decisions, unrelat-
ed to the internal operation of either the trial or the appellate court, [and they] are
for the legislature.1 22
In conclusion, Judge Southwick posited that Davis could be interpreted nar-
rowly by reasoning that the case necessarily addressed the only statute that set a
period of time for appeals to be taken from court to court. 23 In the interest of
consistency, the statute presented an error that had to be corrected by the court
"in order to avoid leaving well-hidden traps even for the reasonably cautious.1 24
By following this reasoning, Davis could avoid being read broadly and as a dis-
placement of prior cases concerning the right to appeal.
, 5
IV ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The recent Newell-Hall decisions implicitly or explicitly raise the question of
whether Davis has in fact extended the judiciary's authority beyond where it
stood before Mr. Davis delayed more than ten days to file his notice of appeal
from county to circuit court. Additionally, at least Judge Southwick seems con-
cerned that the judiciary could go even further and that Newell-Hall has become
the basis to forestall future legislative efforts that may greatly hamper the public
interest. However, for the following reasons, although not necessarily for the
reasons that Judge Southwick has presented in his Wolfe concurrence, Davis
should be read narrowly.




120. Id. at 150 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 and Lawrence J. Franck, Comment, Practice and Procedure
in Mississippi: An Ancient Recipe for Modern Reform, 43 Miss. L. J. 287, 303-304 (1972)).
121. Id. at 150-51 (citing Gill, 574 So. 2d at 586 and Moore, 569 So. 2d at 1148).
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Davis is not a step forward for the judiciary's inherent authority because the
court has gone nowhere. First, the time with which to make an appeal is proce-
dural and should be considered as such under a basic procedural/substantive
Newell-Hall analysis. By regulating the time parameters of an appeal, the court
has stayed within the doctrine because the time within which to take an appeal
looks much like a regulation that concerns internal procedure of the court but
without a substantive cause of action attached. The legislature should thus view
court-to-court procedure as off-limits because of the lack of substance - no
new cause or right of action has been raised. The prescription of appeal timing
is not like the policy decision of having a Litigation Accountability Act.'26
Instead, timing is more like a statute requiring that the request of a trial transcript
be made within a given period 27 where inconsistency in authority is likely to
leave, in the words of Judge Southwick, "well-hidden traps even for the reason-
ably cautious"'28 if those cautious persons have to look in more than one place
for the rule and guess which rule is applicable.
The time for an appeal is also important to the efficiency/effectiveness of the
administration of justice. Much like the use of all permissible court proce-
dures.29 in determining a resolution after the original action has been brought
pursuant to a substantive right granted by the legislature, the timing bears on
how the court system operates as a whole. In an earlier day and age, it may have
been efficient to provide timing rules legislatively, but because of a change in
the times and an increase in the volume of cases, the courts are in a much better
position to determine how the court system as a whole should operate, which is
consistent with the core principles of Newell. 13
Second, accepting that the right to regulate timing of appeals is within the
inherent authority of the judiciary under Newell-Hall, the Davis holding does not
conflict with the cases that Judge Southwick discussed in Wolfe. Moore is dis-
tinguishable because the quote relied upon in Mitchell and later in Wolfe regard-
ing the power of the court to "ingraft" exception upon a right of appeal statute is
misplaced. That quote was supplied in Moore through Presiding Justice
Hawkins, an ardent opponent of Hall,"' and comes directly from Turner v.
Simmons,'32 a case decided in 1911. "' Further, there is no indication that Hall
even came into play in the Moore decision'34 because the court was dealing with
a substantive right of appeal, not a timing issue. The appellant in Moore was
appealing a decision of a county board of supervisors, a governmental body out-
side the court system. For this reason, the right of appeal so vigorously protect-
ed with old case law by Justice Hawkins does not concern the timing of appeal
from court to court.
126. See Stevens, 615 So. 2dat 1177.
127. See Haralson, 308 So. 2d at 222.
128. Wolfe, 799 So. 2d at 151 (Southwick, PJ., concurring).
129. See Towner, 604 So. 2d at 1093.
130. See Newell, 308 So. 2d at 76.
131. See Hall, 539 So. 2d at 1349-65 (Hawkins, P.J., dissenting).
132. 54 So. 658 (Miss. 1911).
133. Justice Hawkins gives an "also" cite to Dependents of Townsend v. Dyer Woodturnings, 459 So. 2d
300 (Miss. 1984) in support of his 1911 case; however, Townsend itself involved an appealfrom an administra-
tive proceeding to court, not a court to court appeal.
134. See Moore, 569 So. 2d at 1148.
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In Wolfe, Judge Southwick's concurrence cited other cases that by distinction
also support this reading of Davis. Gill v. Mississippi Department of Wildlife
Conservation13 did indeed hold that a right of appeal is solely a matter of statute;
however, this was an appeal from the State Employee Appeals Board, and as was
the case in Moore, outside the court system. Further, Fleming136 concerned the
right of appeal in relation to the Post Conviction Relief Act, arguably after the
defendant's case was finished with its turn in the court system. One other case
merits mention and distinction here, Marshall,137 where the defendant sought to
invalidate the establishment of the Court of Appeals. At the core of the court's
response was that the right to appeal was statutory and substantive as to the avail-
ability of courts to which the defendant could address his contentions, not
whether the court system could or could not regulate the timing of when he had
to do so.138
In conclusion, Davis should be read narrowly: the opinion merely holds the
time in which an appeal may be taken, while in the court system, is for the judi-
ciary to decide through the making of rules of procedure. The substance is for
the legislature because, just as it regulates through statutes of limitations, the
elected representatives can decide who gets into the court system, but once the
parties want to move within the court system, judicial rules come into play exclu-
sively. Davis has not moved the line of judicial inherent authority; it has bright-
ened it. Those contemplating the answer to the question "where do I look for the
rules regarding the timing of filing documents for a case that is already in the
court system?" will know, just as they have learned in civil procedure---the
applicable rules of court.
135. 574 So. 2d 586 (Miss. 1990).
136. 553 So. 2d 505 (Miss. 1989).
137. 662 So. 2d 566 (Miss. 1995).
138. This distinguishes between the right to take an appeal and the way in which the court rules provide
that it will move through the court system. In Marshall, the court noted the system used to appropriate cases to
the Court of Appeals through the Supreme Court with the reserved right of the appellant to petition that court
after being heard in the Court of Appeals. The legislature was regulating the right to appeal, with the court's
being concerned with the system in which it would hear it. See Marshall, 662 So. 2d at 566.

